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UK Airport Transport White Paper ‘The Future of Air Transport’ 
An Analysis and Report to the Sustainable Development Commission 
 
MISSED OPPORTUNITY 
Summary Critique of the Air Transport White Paper 
 
 
 
 
1. Principal Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
1.1. The Sustainable Development Commission has 
been tracking the debate about the future of air 
transport in the UK since the publication of the Air 
Transport White Paper – The future of Air Transport - 
(ATWP) in December 2003.We feel it is timely to issue a 
‘Summary Critique’ of the ATWP, focussing in particular 
on two areas: 
 
• the degree to which the ATWP’s analysis and 
conclusions are based on a proper 
understanding of sustainable development 
• the contribution of aviation to the problem of 
climate change and the adequacy of the DfT’s 
response to the contribution. 
1.2. We have not attempted to respond to all the 
different elements in the ATWP, and it should therefore 
be understood that this Summary Critique does not 
constitute a detailed analysis of the White Paper. 
 
 
Recommendations
 
 
 
 
 2. We recommend that the DfT and Defra 
should jointly commission a range of forecasts 
for how air traffic and its greenhouse gas 
emissions are likely to evolve over the next 
thirty years, and what contribution they will 
therefore make to overall global warming on a
range of scenarios. We further recommend 
that the UK actively seeks to ensure that a 
similar exercise is initiated at the European 
level, both to inform the stance which Europe 
takes globally, and to provide the basis for 
some initial programme for restraining 
emissions growth at the European level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. We recommend that in the short-term, DfT 
and Defra clarify the basis on which 
greenhouse gas projections are being made to 
ensure that full account is being taken of the 
radiative forcing of aviation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. It is an extraordinary anomaly that one of the 
most serious and rapidly growing contributors to 
climate change should be so lightly taxed 
throughout the world because of the absence of 
international agreement on a common approach, 
and the threat to the competitiveness of any 
country acting unilaterally. We call on the 
Government to take measures to ensure that 
the aviation industry is taxed according to the 
environmental costs it imposes as externalities
on others (with adequate compensation for 
those most directly affected). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. We have concluded that the cost-benefit 
estimates for additional airport capacity are 
misleadingly optimistic.  We therefore support 
the Environmental Audit Committee’s 
recommendation that the Department for 
Transport (DfT) should address this by 
publishing a new and fully documented 
appraisal, which takes account of the overall, 
forecasted increase in air traffic and call on the
Department for Transport to publish this 
appraisal by the Autumn of 2004.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       
  
 5. Carbon emissions in the developed world 
(including the emissions from international 
aviation, allocated to the countries of departure 
and arrival on a 50-50 basis) need to be cut by a 
minimum of 60% from 1990 levels by 2050. We 
call on the Government to affirm that this 
target (given in the Energy White Paper) 
includes the radiative forcing from emissions 
from domestic and international aviation. 
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2. General Comments 
 
2.1. The rapid growth of air traffic throughout the world 
is one of the most severe threats to the global 
environment today. It causes noise and air pollution, 
and exacerbates local traffic congestion on the land. 
But above all, it is making a rapidly increasing 
contribution to the build-up of greenhouse gases in the 
atmosphere, and to the climate change which they are 
causing. Governments around the world have failed 
completely to confront this problem so far. On the 
contrary, they have done everything they can to 
encourage further growth in order to promote short-
term economic growth and development. It is now 
becoming urgent that they face up to this contradiction, 
and begin the challenging task of building public 
awareness of the fact that air traffic cannot be allowed 
to continue to grow at its present pace, and that policy 
must be reoriented towards restraining rather than 
encouraging growth in air traffic. 
6. We welcome the decision by the DFT to press 
for the incorporation of aviation into the EU’s 
Emissions Trading Scheme (EUETS). We concur 
with its view that this is likely to be provide both 
the most effective and the fairest mechanism for 
ensuring that aviation is required to internalise 
the full costs of its contribution to the problem of 
climate change.  But there is still a huge amount 
of work to be done on both the design and the 
implementation of the EUETS before it delivers 
that outcome.  We call on the Government to 
take all steps within the EU to ensure that the 
EUETS is taken forward. 
 
2.2. This is of course an immense task. It has to start 
with building a stronger public awareness throughout 
the world of the general problem of global warming 
and climate change and of the urgent need to take 
action to mitigate this. It has to go on to educate the 
public about the need to restrain the excessive growth 
of CO₂ and other greenhouse gases in sectors such as 
aviation, and the need to alter the economic activities 
and behaviour that give rise to the production of these 
gases.  
 
7. We recommend that the inclusion of 
aviation in the EUETS is secured before the 
Department for Transport sanctions any airport
expansion, not least so that it can be assessed 
whether such expansion is really necessary 
and feasible.  The resulting economic 
framework should include measures to make 
best use of existing capacity and more 
determined measures to reduce aviation’s 
current environmental impacts. 
2.3. To be fair, the aviation industry has done a certain 
amount to deal with some of its adverse environmental 
impacts. Planes are considerably quieter than thirty 
years ago, although noise still blights many areas near 
airports. Some forms of air pollution from aircraft have 
been much reduced over the same period. But on the 
all-important question of CO₂, progress has been very 
limited. It is true that planes are larger and somewhat 
more efficient in terms of fuel consumption per 
passenger mile than thirty years ago, and some further 
improvements in fuel efficiency are foreseeable in the 
years ahead. More might also be done to reduce 
emissions of water vapour, which exacerbate cloud 
formation and the greenhouse effect, and to reduce 
stacking and other wasteful consumption of energy. 
8. We recommend that pending the inclusion 
of aviation into emissions trading schemes, an 
emissions charge should be levied on all 
flights: first, by the UK Government on 
domestic flights (to show it is serious about 
the issue); second, by the EU (with revenues 
being re-allocated to Member States) on all 
(not just intra-EU) flights. 
 
2.4. But all of the past and projected changes in 
efficiency are dwarfed by the impact of the continuous 
growth of air traffic throughout the world. There is at 
present no viable alternative to fossil fuels as a 
propellant for aircraft remotely in prospect, and no 
possibility that improvements in efficiency could get 
anywhere near the growth in traffic. 
 
2.5. As regards climate change, the aviation sector has 
so far remained largely outside the debate and outside 
the scope of the policy measures being developed to 
restrain CO₂
 
and other greenhouse gas emissions. Air 
traffic emissions have not been included in national 
inventories of greenhouse gas emissions, and are so far 
omitted from emerging restraint schemes such as the 
EUETS. Aviation fuel is not significantly taxed anywhere 
in the world, and countries and localities vie with one 
another to develop more and larger airports and to 
provide incentive packages to lure traffic towards them. 
Old-fashioned growth ambitions for this sector remain 
the common currency of political, commercial and 
public discussion. 
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3. The Air Transport White Paper 
 
3.1. The UK Government's recent White Paper ‘The 
Future of Air Transport’ is still firmly rooted in this 
tradition. It reads as though the increasing demand for 
air traffic is an ineluctable fact, and one that is 
automatically linked with increased growth and 
prosperity for the country. It assumes that the primary 
responsibility of government must simply be to ensure 
that this demand is catered for as smoothly and 
efficiently as possible. It urges acceleration in the 
process of designating and constructing new airports 
and facilities, whose effect will be to sustain and 
encourage further growth of traffic many decades into 
the future. 
 
3.2. The ATWP acknowledges the importance of climate 
change and promises a government initiative to try to 
bring aircraft emissions within the scope of the EUETS 
over the next four years (see section 6 below). But this 
proposition is not put forward with any urgent 
conviction; and past experience does not suggest the 
likelihood of any early or easy success in this initiative. 
Meanwhile, the Government intends to press onwards 
as fast as possible with creating new airport capacity, 
thus fuelling further traffic growth.  
 
3.3. This fundamental contradiction at the heart of 
policy is the more disappointing in that the present UK 
Government has prided itself on its ability to achieve 
joined-up thinking so as to achieve more sustainable 
development, and on its leadership role in relation to 
the climate change debate. There is a serious risk that 
the failure to reshape aviation policy to take proper 
account of the seriousness of the climate change threat 
may undermine the UK Government's leadership role 
on climate change and its ability to carry conviction 
through leading by example.  
 
3.4. To an outside observer, the Department for 
Transport still appears to be too closely respondent to 
the industry it is supposed to regulate, and resistant to 
outside influences and wider policy considerations. The 
Department has not responded to the Commission's 
previous reports on aviation and rejected offers by the 
Sustainable Development Commission to help build a 
wider sustainability framework for policy analysis and 
appraisal while they were preparing their White Paper. 
While this may not be very significant in itself, it is 
symptomatic of a departmental culture that is in 
danger of becoming semi-detached from the 
sustainable development imperative, which the 
Government has wanted to put at its heart. 
 
4.  Sustainable Development Assessment of ATWP 
 
 
4.1 Consistency with the Government’s Sustainable 
Development Strategy 
 
4.1.1. The Government’s Sustainable Development 
Strategy sets out four objectives which the Government 
believes, if achieved at the same time, would deliver 
sustainable development in the UK: 
• Social progress, which meets the needs of 
everyone.  
• Effective protection of the environment.  
• Prudent use of natural resources.  
• Maintenance of high and stable levels of 
economic growth and employment.  
 
4.1.2. In his Foreword to the Strategy, the Prime 
Minister makes clear that its objective is “to ensure that 
our economy, our society and our environment grow 
and develop in harmony”. Elsewhere, and in the 
italicised phrase above, the document makes clear that 
this conception of sustainable development does not 
conform to the standard economic model of trade-offs, 
whereby more economic output means less 
environmental quality, and a better environment can 
only be achieved through economic sacrifice. 
 
4.1.3. In contrast to these declarations, the ATWP is 
entirely couched in terms of environmental sacrifice for 
economic gain. The environmental sacrifice does not 
just consist of increased greenhouse gas emissions, but 
also includes increased noise, increased local air 
emissions and despoliation of the countryside around 
sites proposed for airport expansion. The expansion is 
justified entirely in terms of the economic benefits it 
will bring, which are estimated to exceed the 
environmental and other costs incurred. 
 
4.1.4. As will be seen in the detailed report from Brian 
Pearce of the Centre for Sustainable Investment, there 
is some doubt about even this exceedance of benefits 
over costs. But the whole point of sustainable 
development, in the Government’s formulation of the 
concept, is that developments should benefit both the 
economy and the environment - and achieve social 
progress. The proposals in the ATWP dramatically fail on 
this assessment to be consistent with the Government’s 
strategic commitment to sustainable development. 
 
4.1.5. The Government publishes fifteen ‘headline 
indicators’ to assess progress towards sustainable 
development. The indicators are: economic output, 
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investment, employment, poverty and social inclusion, 
education, health, housing, crime, climate change, air 
quality, road traffic, river water quality, wildlife (as 
indicated by birds), land-use and waste. The Strategy 
makes clear that “The Government’s aim is for all the 
headline indicators to move in the right direction over 
time”. There is some doubt as to whether the 
expansion of aviation will increase output, investment 
or employment more than would otherwise have 
occurred, but it seems certain to increase greenhouse 
gas emissions, reduce air quality (and increase noise), 
increase road traffic and develop previously 
undeveloped land.  
 
4.1.6. The principal failure is that full account is not 
taken of ‘all costs and benefits’, which implies that 
there has also been a failure to take an adequately 
long-term perspective.  The key cost-benefit estimates 
supporting decisions to expand capacity are 
misleadingly optimistic as the result of the omission of 
some key costs.  More important for the long-term 
framework is that passengers and the industry will not 
face the true resource costs of providing that capacity, 
and so decisions will continue to be based on a 
distorted view of the underlying strength of demand 
for additional capacity. 
 
4.2   Consistency with the SDC’s Principles of 
Sustainable Development (SD) – see Annex 1 
 
4.2.1. A brief assessment of the ATWP against each of 
the Commission’s Six Principles  follows: 
 
Putting Sustainable Development at the Centre: as has 
already been stated, the ATWP provides a classic 
example of being prepared to trade-off the 
environment for economic output. This Principle rejects 
‘crude trade-offs’, in favour of ‘the pursuit of mutually 
reinforcing benefits’. The ATWP makes absolutely no 
attempt at such a pursuit. It clearly violates this 
Principle. 
 
Valuing Nature: the ATWP values nature, in the sense of 
giving it monetary value, in order to justify the trade-
off it is proposing. This is not what is meant by this 
Principle, which speaks of constraining economic 
activity within environmental limits. It has been seen 
that the growth of aviation threatens to make 
meaningless (according to the Environmental Audit 
Commission) perhaps the most important current 
environmental limit – the UK contribution to radiative 
forcing which, with similar action by other countries, 
could limit climate change to tolerable levels. The 
ATWP clearly violates this Principle. 
 
Fair Shares: this Principle talks about meeting people’s 
basic needs across the world, of improving quality of 
life within the Earth’s carrying capacity, and of 
economic efficiency. The expansion of aviation is not 
about meeting people’s basic needs – but its 
contribution to climate change will make it more 
difficult for some of the world’s poorest people to meet 
their basic needs in future. It will contribute to some 
people’s quality of life, but only by reducing the quality 
of life of others, and by breaching the atmosphere’s 
carrying capacity for greenhouse gases. The ATWP 
clearly fails to be consistent with this Principle. 
 
Polluter Pays: the ATWP says that it intends “that the 
price of air travel reflects its environmental and social 
impacts”, and recognises the ‘polluter pays principle’. 
But it recommends no firm measures to ensure that 
this will be achieved. There is no general principle that 
all those affected locally by the external costs of 
aviation expansion will be compensated. There is no 
action by the Government to internalise the costs of 
emissions where it could have done so (for example, in 
respect of domestic flights). There is no commitment to 
emissions charges at the EU level. There is only a stated 
commitment to (the uncertain) incorporation of the 
aviation sector in the EUETS some years in the future. 
(See below). The ATWP as it stands is therefore 
inconsistent with this SD Principle, but this situation 
may or may not change depending on future 
government policy. 
 
Good Governance: opinions will probably differ as to 
whether or not the process of preparing the ATWP was 
an example of “effective, participative systems of 
governance and institutions, engaging the interest and 
creativity of all citizens”. In the absence of detailed 
research, no assessment of the ATWP is given here in 
respect of this Principle. 
 
Adopting a Precautionary Approach: it has been noted 
above that the expansion of aviation as envisaged in 
the ATWP threatens to render meaningless the 
Government’s targets on greenhouse gas emissions, 
and provides a classic example of ‘unsustainable 
development that pays insufficient regard to wider 
impacts’. The ATWP therefore clearly violates this 
Principle. 
 
4.2.2. This brief assessment, on the basis of the analysis 
in BP 2004 and evidence from other sources, therefore 
suggests that the ATWP violates no fewer than five out 
of the six Principles of the Sustainable Development 
Commission. 
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5. Climate Change                                                                                                                                                                                     
5.4. The scale of this increase was calculated recently 
by the Environmental Audit Committee of the House of 
Commons (EAC 2004). It showed that the contribution 
of aviation to UK radiative forcing in 2050 would, with 
the projected growth in aviation, amount to 66% of the 
Government’s CO
 
5.1. The Government’s Chief Scientific Adviser, 
Professor Sir David King, has recently warned that 
climate change is a more serious threat to humanity 
even than international terrorism. In response to the 
threat of climate change, the Government adopted in 
its Energy White Paper of February 2003 an objective of 
reducing UK CO₂ emissions to 60% below their 1990 
level by 2050; the only Government to have announced 
such an ambitious objective. 
 
5.2. Europe, with the UK prominent amongst its 
leaders, has done more than most to keep the climate 
change issue firmly on the map, and to seek decisive 
international action for the control of greenhouse 
gases. Europe and its Member States have ratified the 
Kyoto convention and are pressing forward with an 
emissions trading scheme for carbon emissions 
intended to restrain relevant emissions within a ceiling 
or cap. And although they have so far failed to agree 
on a common basis for carbon taxation throughout the 
Union, individual countries, including the UK, have in 
place a variety of measures to tax energy and fuel that 
at least exercise a little more restraint on the 
consumption of fossil fuels than prevails in the USA and 
some other parts of the world.  
 
5.3. Aviation poses very special challenges in respect of 
climate change. Its radiative forcing is a multiple 
(somewhere between 2 and 4, but normally taken to 
be 2.5) of its CO₂ emissions (IPCC 1999). According to 
the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution, the 
scope for technological change in order to mitigate 
these impacts is relatively small, certainly much smaller 
than the increases in aviation, which are now in 
prospect. There is therefore little doubt that, if these 
increases (with passenger numbers growing from 
around 100 million in 1990 to 300-500 million by 2030) 
are realised, UK aviation will very substantially increase 
its contribution to climate change. 
 
2
 emission target (not including 
aviation) for 2050 (EAC 2004, p.23). (The calculation by 
the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution was 
that aviation in 2050 would contribute nearly 75% of 
UK radiative forcing (including that from aviation). The 
difference is due to the EAC assuming that the 60% 
carbon reduction target by 2050 applied only to non-
aviation UK emissions, while the RCEP assumed that the
60% carbon reduction target applied to total UK 
radiative forcing. This is something on which 
clarification would be desirable). 
 
5.5. The only actual policy measure in the ATWP to 
address the impact of aviation on climate change is an 
expressed intention to bring aviation within the EUETS 
from 2008. This is discussed below. 
 
6. Emissions Trading  
 
6.1. As noted above, the only real policy measure in 
the ATWP to address the climate change impacts of the 
aviation sector was a statement of intent to get the 
sector incorporated in the EUETS from 2008 “or as soon 
as possible thereafter” (DfT 2003, p.40).  
 
6.2. First, it should be noted that the EAC (2004) was 
unimpressed by the Government’s stated commitment 
to incorporate the aviation sector in the EUETS and, in 
due course, in a global ETS. The Committee pointed out 
the uncertainty of adapting the EU scheme to include 
aviation, the time this would take (making the 
proposed 2008 date at least difficult, and probably 
impossible, to achieve), and the non-existence as yet 
either of a global scheme or the political will to 
establish one. The Committee further pointed out: “It is 
inconceivable that any emission trading system could 
generate sufficient credits to allow aviation to expand 
as forecast, while at the same time delivering carbon 
reductions of the order needed. The price of carbon 
could, in such circumstances, go through the roof – 
provided there was sufficient political will to maintain 
targets and enforce penalties”. The Committee also 
noted that the Government had turned its back on 
more promising policy instruments, such as an EU 
emissions charge, on which substantial preparatory 
work had already been done, and which could in all 
probability be implemented relatively quickly if the 
political will were there. 
 
6.3. The EAC concluded: “If aviation increases on the 
scale predicted by the DfT, the UK’s 60% carbon 
emission reduction target which the Government set 
last year will become meaningless and unachievable”. 
 
6.4. In respect of emissions trading, it has been noted 
that, in principle, the only economically efficient 
environmental policy instruments are environmental 
taxes and auctioned emission permits. This is because 
these are the only instruments that require users of 
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resources to pay for all their use of the resource. There 
is no mention in the ATWP of auctioned emission 
permits. 
  
6.5. The implications of the ATWP for future public 
policy on climate change, for the aviation and other 
sectors, are stark. If the new facilities envisaged are 
actually built, the industry will (not implausibly) claim 
that the ATWP is an implicit social contract that they 
should be operated so that they can generate the 
revenue required to pay for them. If a future 
Government seeks to maintain the carbon targets, with 
aviation in an emissions trading scheme, such that 
aviation has to buy very large numbers of permits, the 
price of these permits is likely, as foreseen by the EAC, 
“to go through the roof”. The price of aviation would 
need to increase substantially to pay for the permits. 
The demand for aviation would fall. The new facilities 
might not manage to generate the required passenger 
numbers to provide the revenue the industry needs and 
is expecting.  
 
6.6. The position taken by the ATWP will also make it 
harder to argue the climate change issue with other 
economic sectors, which can respond quite reasonably 
that if such an emissions increase can be envisaged for 
aviation, they should be granted similar treatment. 
 
6.7. This is the contradiction at the heart of the 
emissions-trading approach to addressing aviation’s 
climate change impacts, in the context of the 
expansion proposed in the ATWP. In fact, this approach 
does little to resolve the contradiction between the 
expansion of aviation and climate stability. Unless 
aviation is allocated lots of permits commensurate with 
its expansion (and one might expect that there would 
be opposition to this from other sectors in the trading 
scheme if this meant that their allocations would be 
reduced, as they would have to be if the overall targets 
were to be maintained), aviation would end up paying 
huge sums for permits, which would inevitably cut back 
the demand for aviation, which the sector will need to 
pay for the facilities it will have built 
 
6.8. In principle, the SDC agrees that it highly desirable 
that aviation should become incorporated into an 
emissions trading scheme that is eventually both global 
and with auctioned permits, but the problems with the 
approach in the ATWP may be summarised as follows: 
• It pushes well into the future any measures to 
tackle the climate change impacts of aviation. 
The aviation sector may not be included in the 
EUETS for nearly ten years (if the EU 2008 
window is missed, which it almost certainly 
will be, then 2013 becomes the earliest 
realistic date for inclusion in the EU scheme).  
• It fails to resolve the essential contradiction 
between the sector generating the huge 
increase in demand it will need to fill the 
facilities, which will shortly be constructed, 
and the reduction in emissions, which is 
required for climate stability. The whole idea 
that a single carbon-intensive sector can 
expand its contribution to climate change by a 
factor of 3 (from 1990 to 2050) while other 
sectors are somehow going to reduce theirs by 
more than half plus an amount to offset the 
increase in aviation emissions, simply defies 
objective credibility. 
• If aviation does buy lots of permits in a tight 
emissions market, the price will choke off the 
demand that is needed to fill the new facilities 
that are to be built.  
 
 
 
 
 
Jonathon Porritt 
Chairman – Sustainable Development Commission 
June 2004 
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Annex 1 
THE SDC's PRINCIPLES FOR SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT 
 
1. Putting sustainable development at the centre 
Sustainable development should be the organising 
principle of all democratic societies, underpinning all 
other goals, policies and processes. It provides a 
framework for integrating economic, social and 
environmental concern over time, not through crude 
trade-offs, but through the pursuit of mutually 
reinforcing benefits. It promotes good governance, 
healthy living, innovation, life-long learning and all 
forms of economic growth, which secure the natural 
capital upon which we depend. It reinforces social 
harmony and seeks to secure each individual's 
prospects of leading a fulfilling life. 
 
2. Valuing nature 
We are and always will be part of Nature, embedded in 
the natural world, and totally dependent for our own 
economic and social wellbeing on the resources and 
systems that sustain life on Earth. These systems have 
limits, which we breach at our peril. All economic 
activity must be constrained within those limits. We 
have an inescapable moral responsibility to pass on to 
future generations a healthy and diverse environment, 
and critical natural capital unimpaired by economic 
development. Even as we learn to manage our use of 
the natural world more efficiently, so we must affirm 
those individual beliefs and belief systems, which 
revere Nature for its intrinsic value, regardless of its 
economic and aesthetic value to humankind. 
 
3. Fair shares 
Sustainable economic development means “fair shares 
for all”, ensuring that people’s basic needs are properly 
met across the world, whilst securing constant 
improvements in the quality of peoples’ lives through 
efficient, inclusive economies. “Efficient” simply means 
generating as much economic value as possible from 
the lowest possible throughput of raw materials and 
energy. “Inclusive” means securing high levels of paid, 
high quality employment, with internationally 
recognised labour rights and fair trade principles 
vigorously defended, whilst properly acknowledging 
the value to our wellbeing of unpaid family work, 
caring, parenting, volunteering and other informal 
livelihoods. Once basic needs are met, the goal is to 
achieve the highest quality of life for individuals and 
communities, within the Earth’s carrying capacity, 
though transparent, properly-regulated markets which 
promote both social equity and personal prosperity. 
 
4. Polluter pays 
Sustainable development requires that we make 
explicit the costs of pollution and inefficient resource 
use, and reflect those in the prices we pay for all 
products and services, recycling the revenues from 
higher prices to drive the sustainability revolution that 
is now so urgently needed, and compensating those 
whose environments have been damaged. In pursuit of 
environmental justice, no part of society should be 
disproportionately impacted by environmental pollution 
or blight, and all people should have the same right to 
pure water, clean air, nutritious food and other key 
attributes of a healthy, life-sustaining environment. 
 
5. Good governance 
There is no one blue-print for delivering Sustainable 
development. It requires different strategies in 
different societies. But all strategies will depend on 
effective, participative systems of governance and 
institutions, engaging the interest, creativity and 
energy of all citizens. We must therefore celebrate 
diversity, practice tolerance and respect. However, 
good governance is a two-way process. We should all 
take responsibility for promoting sustainability in our 
own lives and for engaging with others to secure more 
sustainable outcomes in society. 
 
6. Adopting a precautionary approach 
Scientists, innovators and wealth creators have a crucial 
part to play in creating genuinely sustainable economic 
progress. But human ingenuity and technological power 
is now so great that we are capable of causing serious 
damage to the environment or to peoples’ health 
through unsustainable development that pays 
insufficient regard to wider impacts. Society needs to 
ensure that there is full evaluation of potentially 
damaging activities so as to avoid or minimise risks. 
Where there are threats of serious or irreversible 
damage to the environment or human health, the lack 
of full scientific certainty should not be used as a 
reason to delay taking cost-effective action to prevent 
or minimise such damage. 
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AN ASSESSMENT OF THE AIR TRANSPORT WHITE PAPER 
A report to the UK Sustainable Development Commission by Brian Pearce, Director of the Centre 
for Sustainable Investment (Forum for the Future) 
 
OBJECTIVE 
 
The Centre for Sustainable Investment was asked by the Sustainable Development Commission to 
analyse the Air Transport White Paper (ATWP) ‘The Future of Air Transport’.  The aim of this 
analysis is to identify the extent to which it has set out a 30-year framework that is consistent 
with the development of a sustainable aviation industry, as predicated by the SDC’s six principles 
for sustainable development (see Annex 1). 
 
BACKGROUND 
 
The Government has quite rightly realised that a long-term policy framework needs to be put in 
place for key infrastructure assets.  Market liberalisation and competition are insufficient to deliver 
the investment required.  Energy and Water have had their own long-term reviews.  It is clear that 
a sensible, 30-year framework for Air Transport is also essential if that infrastructure investment is 
to be consistent with the sustainable development of the UK economy.  The current situation is far 
from satisfactory.  As Dieter Helm points out: 
 
‘Decisions based on a[n economic regulation] structure in which one of the busiest airports in the 
world (Heathrow) has among the lowest prices, where cross-subsidy is endemic, and where 
environmental damage is largely unpriced, are certain to be wrong by a very considerable 
degree.’1
 
Yet the publication of the ATWP reveals very little in the ‘long-term framework’ that will correct 
these market price distortions.  It announces a number of decisions to expand airport capacity, but 
little that will make aviation prices reflect the true resource cost of providing that capacity, which 
itself would provide a true test of the strength of underlying demand for additional capacity. 
 
The ATWP itself points out that: 
 
‘A sustainable approach entails first making better use of existing airports before supporting the 
provision of additional capacity’2. 
 
                                                          
1 See Helm, D and D. Holt (2003) p2. 
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It is hard to understand how this is to be achieved without pricing of existing capacity being based 
on the sort of economic approach routinely applied in other industries.  Economic efficiency, 
moreover, is but one aspect of achieving a sustainable air transport industry.   
 
The DfT’s professed overall aim is to ensure ‘transport that works for everyone’, balancing the 
need to travel with the need to improve the quality of life, which means seeking solutions that 
meet long-term economic, social and environmental goals.3  To realise this aim, the DfT states that 
decision-making (including the ATWP) will adopt the following principles: 
• Putting people at the centre; 
• Taking a long-term perspective; 
• Taking account of costs and benefits; 
• Creating an open and supportive economic system; 
• Combating poverty and social exclusion; 
• Respecting environmental limits; 
• The precautionary principle; 
• Transparency, information, participation and access to justice; 
• Making the polluter pay. 
 
SUMMARY CONCLUSIONS 
 
We argue below that the ATWP fails to meet the DfT’s own principles (or those of the Sustainable 
Development Commission) in a number of respects: 
• The principal failure is that full account is not taken of all ‘costs and benefits’, which implies 
that there has also been a failure to take an adequately long-term perspective.  The key cost-
benefit estimates supporting decisions to expand capacity are misleadingly optimistic as a 
result of the omission of some key costs.  More important for the long-term framework is that 
passengers and industry will not face the true resource costs of providing that capacity, and so 
decisions will continue to be based on a distorted view of the underlying strength of demand 
for additional capacity; 
• The adoption of environmental limits on local air pollution and noise around Heathrow airport 
is clearly consistent with ‘respecting environmental limits’.  However, this principle has not 
been consistently applied across the country in the case of noise, for instance at Manchester 
airport. 
• Perhaps the most significant inconsistency with this principle is the impact of increasing 
airport capacity on UK air transport’s contribution to climate change.  Such is the scale of 
forecast increases in greenhouse gas emissions from the industry that it is hard to see how 
this is consistent with the Government’s target of a 60% reduction in CO2 emissions by 2050.  
                                                                                                                                                                      
2 See DfT (2003) p24. 
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Estimates by the RCEP suggest that the rest of the economy would have to reduce its 
emissions from the 2000 level of 150 million tonnes to 17 million tonnes, if aviation’s forecast 
emissions are to be accommodated. 
• ‘Making the polluter pay’ is a key principle if market mechanisms are to be used to help 
deliver environmental goals.  Air transport prices need to reflect the true resource costs of 
providing infrastructure, including environmental costs.  This does not mean that profitability 
needs to be cut.  It does mean the industry should face the costs of its emissions and noise, 
even if the financial costs of this are offset by, for instance, lower taxes on labour as with the 
UK Climate Change Levy.  The ATWP makes some steps towards this but, as discussed below, it 
appears to be a commitment that is much weaker than is necessary.  The measures to get 
prices to reflect noise and local air pollution costs are even weaker.  As a result there is no 
guarantee that the polluter will pay, and therefore no guarantee of the most effective 
incentives to reduce and mitigate pollution. 
 
The key issues  
 
The key issue to be addressed is the adequacy of the 30-year strategic framework for the air 
transport industry that the ATWP describes, emphasising “the need for a balanced approach, 
recognising both the costs and benefits of air travel.’4
 
There are two principal mechanisms in which such a framework can recognise such costs and 
benefits, and both of these are examined in some detail below:   
• The first is that the Government can recognise them in its cost-benefit analysis of airport 
capacity expansion decisions;   
• The second is that the industry and passengers can recognise them if they are all reflected in 
prices paid, in which case the underlying strength of demand for additional capacity will be 
revealed as passengers and airlines respond to these prices. 
 
In both, it appears as though the ATWP only partially recognises the associated costs and benefits, 
with the result that it exaggerates the net benefits of, and demand for, additional airport capacity.  
More fundamentally, the framework appears to be a mixture of ‘predict and provide,’ forecast-
based capacity provision and partial measures to correct the distortions in the market by getting 
prices to reflect the true resource costs of aviation.     
 
The ‘predict and provide’ element is clear from the use of passenger forecasts out to 2030 to 
estimate economic benefits and support the cost-benefit calculations used in the decisions to 
provide additional airport capacity.  All experience has shown these forecasting exercises will fail, 
                                                                                                                                                                      
3 See Hwww.dft.gov.uk/stellent/groups/dft_transstrate/documents/page/dft_transstrat_027569.hcspH. 
 4
which is exactly why market-based approaches have been introduced in most other industries.  A 
market-based approach would have put in place measures to allow the underlying strength of 
demand for additional capacity to be revealed by getting prices to reflect the true resource costs of 
providing that capacity.  Measures to achieve this have only been addressed to a limited extent in 
the ATWP.   
 
If airport service prices are to reflect their true resource costs, they must take into account the 
value placed by users on existing capacity, the long-term incremental cost of building new 
capacity and the environment costs of using that capacity.  There is some discussion of the trading 
of slots and carbon emission allowances in the White Paper, but a proper discussion of how a 
market-based framework for getting airport service prices to reflect their true resource costs is 
nowhere to be found. 
 
The discussions on these issues is structured as follows: 
 
 
1 Airport capacity expansion decisions 
 
We conclude that the cost-benefit estimates for additional capacity are misleadingly 
optimistic.  As the Environmental Audit Committee says: 
“The quality of the economic appraisal of options carried out by the DfT is poor, and the 
supporting analysis contained in ‘Aviation and Global Warming’ (DfT 2004), is opaque and 
unhelpful.  The DfT should address this by publishing a new and fully documented 
appraisal, which takes account of the overall forecast increase in air traffic.” 
 
1.1 Net economic benefits 
1.1.1 Lower discount rate 
 
Net economic benefit estimates for the additional runways at Stansted and 
Heathrow have been doubled to £17 billion by the used of a much lower discount 
rate.  However, it is sensible for public policy to value future outcomes more 
highly – and it will also raise the cost of climate change. 
 
1.1.2 Inclusion of Air Passenger Duty 
 
Supporting documentation shows that 40% of economic benefits consist of Air 
Passenger Duty (APD), a tax.  This looks odd since transfers such as the ticket 
price from passengers to carriers are not counted as creating economic value.  
However, in this case, APD is quite rightly included since in its absence either 
                                                                                                                                                                      
4 DfT (2003) p21. 
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ticket prices would be lower, boosting ‘user benefits’, or profit margins higher, 
boosting ‘producer benefits’. 
 
 
 
1.1.3 Inclusion of foreign passengers in economic benefits 
 
One major criticism is that the ATWP does not clearly identify the net benefits to 
the UK from additional airport capacity, as opposed to benefits accruing to 
overseas passengers.  Yet HM Treasury guidance states clearly that ‘Generally 
proposals should not proceed if, despite a net benefit overall [i.e. including 
overseas residents], there is a net cost to the UK (for instance, after taking into 
account environmental costs.’5  Based on earlier research for the SERAS 
consultation, we have been able to identify that almost half of estimated ‘user 
benefits’ accrue to foreign passengers.  Excluding these benefits reduces the 
estimated net economic benefit of the new runway at Stansted from £9 billion to 
£6 billion. 
 
1.1.4 Inclusion of people outside the UK in climate change costs 
 
However, if the capacity decision is to take into account the resulting costs of 
climate change, then overseas residents should be included.  Much of the costs of 
climate change will fall on overseas residents (largely in low-lying, low-income 
developing countries).  If costs to overseas residents are included then so should 
benefits.  In which case the benefits of the Stansted runway net of construction, 
noise and climate change costs are estimated at between £6 and £8 billion. 
 
1.1.5 Wider economic impacts 
 
It has been found that some of the claims by the ATWP for wider economic 
benefits from capacity expansion cannot be supported.  Although wider economic 
impacts are not included in the cost-benefit estimates, they are used in the ATWP 
to support the case for capacity expansion: ‘Failure to provide additional capacity 
would become a barrier to future economic growth and competitiveness’6.  Yet 
an influential analysis by Berkley Hanover Consulting published some time ago 
doubted that other industries or UK business generally would be significantly 
                                                          
5 See HM Treasury (2003), ‘Greenbook, Appraisal and Evaluation in Central Government’, chapter 5 
‘Appraising the options’. 
6 See DfT (2003) p25 
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harmed by restricting airport capacity.  It pointed out that the resulting higher air 
transport prices would reduce the more price-sensitive leisure travel, not 
business.  Since leisure travel makes up around two-thirds of passenger trips it 
may not take much of a rise in prices to free up capacity for the needs of UK 
business.  There is little evidence that restricting airport capacity would 
significantly damage UK business. 
 
1.2 Social impacts 
1.2.1 Compensating local communities 
 
One failure of the ATWP has been the lack of any substantial measures to deal 
with the losers from airport capacity expansion.  It is clear that the ‘winners’ (the 
35 million additional passengers forecast to result from the proposed extra 
runways at Stansted and Heathrow) in aggregate place greater value on flying 
than the value placed on the resulting environmental cost by the residents 
around those airports.  Nonetheless, there are 10,000 households living around 
Stansted who are estimated to lose £16 million in housing value.  There are 
232,000 households living around Heathrow who are estimated to lose £427 
million.  Yet the well-established principle of compensating losers from the gains 
of the winners appears to be rejected by the ATWP.  Instead of proposing an 
extension of the existing BAA scheme at Stansted (that compensates residents 
for the loss of housing value from additional aircraft noise), it suggests losers 
should seek compensation under the Land Compensation Act 1973. 
 
1.2.2 Exposure to accident risk 
 
While the ATWP quite rightly says that safety continues to be of prime 
importance, it is not clear that in practice there will not be an increased risk of 
accident from the predicted rise in aircraft movements.  Although new 
developments around airports will be adequately controlled by Public Safety 
Zones, there is concern that local authorities may not be enforcing the 
requirement for airports to relocate those in occupied buildings within the 
1:100,000 accident risk zone. 
 
1.2.3 External costs of land-take, local air quality and congestion 
 
The major omission from the cost-benefit estimates has been any measure of the 
environmental costs from the additional airport infrastructure itself.  As Prof. 
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David Pearce observes7:  ‘The government’s consultation on airport expansion in 
the South East of England – the area with the highest level of passenger demand 
– has pursued only a truncated form of cost-benefit analysis, with the potential 
for producing misleading results…No attempt has been made to monetise the 
environmental cost of the land-take (use and non-use values), air pollution or 
surface disamenity from added road and rail congestion.  Reference is made to 
additional benefits from airport expansion, such as raised productivity elsewhere 
in the economy, but no mention is made of reduced productivity effects from 
added noise, pollution and disamenity-related stress…Failure to conduct the cost-
benefit studies in a more comprehensive fashion to allow for all environmental 
impacts produces misleadingly optimistic results for airport expansion.’  Whether 
or not the inclusion of these costs would eliminate the estimated net benefit is 
impossible to say without further research, but it is clear that the benefits have 
been exaggerated by this omission. 
 
1.2.4 Developing country equity issues 
 
The major equity or distributional issue associated with providing additional 
capacity for air transport is not so much the access to flying for low-income 
residents of the UK – who are relatively rich by world standards – but the costs of 
climate change imposed on the low-income residents of developing countries. 
 
2 An economic framework for airport capacity use 
 
The main failure of the ATWP is the lack of an adequate economic framework.  The distortions 
in the market are apparent from Heathrow’s position as one of the busiest airports in the 
world, but with airport charges at less than half those in the US and Japan.  There is only a 
partial attempt to correct market distortions by getting air transport prices to reflect the true 
resource costs of providing additional capacity, including environmental costs. 
 
2.1 Economic incentives 
2.1.1 Dual-till price regulation or cross-subsidies 
 
The cross-subsidy from shopping to aviation activities reduces the extent to which 
airport prices reflect the true resource costs of providing that capacity.  A ‘dual-
till’ calculation of activities solely associated with air transport suggests that 
airport charges at Gatwick, Stansted and Manchester do not, or only barely, cover 
operating profits.  A ‘dual-till’ rather than ‘single-till’ approach to price regulation 
                                                          
7 See Helm, D and D. Holt (2003). 
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(based solely on the cost of providing aviation services) are therefore likely to be 
considerably higher at these airports.  The Civil Aviation Authority has argued this 
case strongly, but in the most recent 5-year regulatory review was over-ruled by 
the Competition Commission, which argued shopping was an integral and 
inseparable part of the airport ‘product’. 
 
2.1.2 Peak-load pricing 
 
Price mechanisms to balance fluctuating demand with available capacity have 
been long used in major utility industries, particularly electricity and 
telecommunications.  Indeed airlines’ use of ‘dynamic pricing’ is standard 
practice.  Yet it is generally restricted to a difference between summer and 
winter charging in the airport industry.  In the power sector, peak-load pricing 
was found to have saved up to 20% of new capacity requirements.  A major 
omission of the ATWP is the use of use peak-load pricing to test the underlying 
strength of demand for additional airport capacity. 
 
2.1.3 Slot auctions 
 
There are some strong signals that airport charges do not reflect either the 
resource cost of providing capacity or the value placed by users on that capacity.  
Capital values attributed to the exchange of some slots at Heathrow airport 
translate to a value of £50 per passenger trip, some eight times the maximum 
allowed airport charge in 2003-04 of £6.48 per passenger.  The existing system 
of ‘grandfathering’ slots to incumbent users appears to have led to exceptional 
asset value gains for carriers at congested airports, as well as potentially higher 
returns from operating in markets that are less open to competition because of 
the scarcity of slots.  It is encouraging to see in the ATWP that the Government 
does wish to see European legislation to promote a market-based slot allocation 
system that encourages the more efficient use of scarce airport capacity. 
 
2.2 Environmental incentives 
2.2.1 Climate change 
 
It is encouraging that the ATWP recognises the problem of climate change and 
makes some small steps in the right direction of providing a solution.  However, 
these steps are inadequate.  The Government promises to use its Presidency of 
the EU in 2005 to prepare for the inclusion of aviation in the EU Emissions Trading 
Scheme, but there is no guarantee that this will occur.  Even if it does, it is 
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unlikely to occur soon.  Moreover, many find the fall-back plan of a unilateral or 
bilateral alternative economic instrument (e.g. a tax) to lack credibility.  The 
ATWP could have lent support to an early application of the much discussed and 
analysed EU-wide emissions charge, which would cover pollutants excluded from 
the EU ETS and provide an incentive for prompt entry into the trading scheme.  
The UK should moreover take full advantage of its Presidency in 2005 to widen 
the coverage of any inclusion of aviation in the EU ETS by pressing the ICAO and 
the UNFCCC for a resolution of the problem of the omission of aviation bunker 
fuels from national inventories. 
 
2.2.2 Air quality 
 
The use of EU air quality standards will ensure that some environmental 
objectives are met around Heathrow airport.  However, it remains to be seen 
whether full use will be made of market mechanisms to help achieve these 
targets at the lowest resource cost.  The Secretary of State promises legislation to 
allow an emissions-related element in landing charges – but only if Parliamentary 
time permits.  Since the new ICAO engine emission standards do not require an 
accelerated phase-out of existing dirtier engines, there may not be much 
reduction of aircraft emissions.  An emissions-related charge would provide an 
incentive for faster action as well as revenue for the investment required to 
reduce emissions from vehicles driving to and from airports. 
 
2.2.3 Noise 
 
The noise ‘budget’ set at Heathrow in the ATWP will ensure that an additional 
environmental standard is met at this airport.  ‘Any further development could 
only be considered on the basis that it resulted in no net increase in the total 
area of the 57 dbA noise contour compared with summer 2002, a contour area of 
127 sq.km.’  It is disappointing that there is nothing in the ATWP to reduce the 
resource cost of complying with this regulation through permitting the trading of 
noise ‘allowances’.  More importantly, the noise ‘budget’ approach has not been 
consistently applied across the country.  For instance, in the case of Manchester 
airport, the ATWP recognises that capacity expansion plans will increase the 
number of people living within the 57 dbA noise contour from 45,000 to 70,000.  
However, it states that ‘we do not believe, on balance, that these impacts are so 
severe that constraints should be imposed on the development of the airport to 
prevent it growing to the levels of demand forecast.’ 
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3 Joined-up Government policies 
3.1 Consistency with 60% carbon reduction target 
 
The forecast growth in air transport permitted by the airport capacity expansion 
proposed in the ATWP does not appear to be consistent with the Energy White Paper 
target to reduce carbon emissions by 60% from 2000 levels by 2050.  The Royal 
Commission on Environmental Pollution estimates that, if this target were to be 
enforced, then aviation would have a 75% share of UK carbon emissions and other 
industries would have to cut their emissions from 150 million tonnes in 2000 to just 17 
million tonnes by 2050.  A senior DfT official admitted this point to the Environmental 
Audit Committee recently ‘…What you said was, would other sectors need to contract 
further in order to accommodate aviation.  The answer to that would only be yes if you 
stuck to your existing target, but added in another huge chunk of emissions from 
aviation which was not previously there.’8. 
 
3.2 Consistency with integrated transport plans 
 
The elasticity with which higher prices for air transport encourage a switch to alternative 
forms of transport depends on the availability of capacity in those substitutes.  Public 
and private investment in rail, ferry and road infrastructure will increase this elasticity 
and the effectiveness of price-based policies to switch travel away from air.  The ATWP 
acknowledges that Eurostar has already gained 60% of the market for London-Paris 
passengers and 50% of the market on the London-Brussels route.  However, there is 
little discussion about how capacity investment in rail and other forms of transport will 
be integrated with airport capacity decisions. 
 
                                                          
8 Oral evidence to the Environmental Audit Committee in response to Q345 on 24th February 2004 by 
Mr Graham Pendlebury, Head of Aviation Environmental Division, DfT. 
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